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I.

PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION OF UTAH.
On January 28, 1985, W. S. Hatch Company ("Hatch") filed

an action in the Utah Federal District Court against American Salt
Company ("American Salt") to collect tariff charges for transportation services rendered for American Salt.

On April 2, 1985,

American Salt filed a Verified Petition with the Utah Public
Service Commission (the "Commission") claiming that Hatch's salt
tariff was unreasonable, discriminatory and should not be applied
under the circumstances of this case.

Hatch filed a motion, with

supporting affidavits, to dismiss American Salt's Petition on the
ground that Hatch, as a matter of law, was obligated to charge the
tariff rate.

In view of Amercan Salt's Verified Petition, the

Affidavits filed by Hatch and factual admissions of the parties,
the Commission, in accordance with Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, considered Hatch's Motion to Dismiss as a Motion
for Summary Judgment.
After a hearing, the Commission issued a Report and Order
dismissing American Salt's Petition.

The Commission held that the

salt tariff was reasonable and that Hatch was legally obligated to
collect the tariff rate irrespective of any oral or written
agreement which may have provided for a lower rate. The Commission
denied American Salt's Application for Rehearing.
The appellant, American Salt, has appealed the
Commission's Report and Order dismissing its Petition.
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II.

FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.
From April 16, 1984 to May 3, 1984, Hatch hauled 406

truckloads of salt for American Salt from the Amax ponds to the
American Salt plant at GrantsviLle, Utah.

At the time the services

were performed, American Salt knew that part of the haul was over a
public road (R. 0028); however, Hatch operated under a mistake of
fact, believing that the haul was entirely over private roads and
was therefore an unregulated haul.

(R. 0325, 0344).

Because Hatch

assumed that an unregulated haul was involved and American Salt had
represented to Hatch that between 75,000 and 80,000 tons of salt
would be hauled, the parties orally agreed on an hourly rate of
$59.80 per hour.

(R. 0318, 0325).

Sometime after the haul was completed Hatch discovered
that part of the haul was over a public road, making it a regulated
haul, and, by Utah statute, one that had to be billed at the
current tariff rates on file with the Commission.

(R. 0328).

Accordingly, Hatch sent a bill to American Salt for the cost of the
haul calculated in accordance with the tariff rate.

American Salt

refused to pay the tariff rate, and Hatch filed an action in
Federal Court to recover the sums due and owing under the tariff.
(R. 0344).
On April 2, 1985, one day before American Salt's Answer to
Hatch's Amended Complaint was clue, American Salt filed a Verified
Petition with the Commission claiming that Hatch's salt tariff was
unreasonable, discriminatory, and should not be applied under the
circumstances of this case, and should therefore be set aside.
-2-

(R. 0070).

Hatch filed a Motion to Dismiss American Salt's

Petition on the ground that Hatch, as a matter of law, was
obligated to charge the tariff rate.

(R. 0182).

American Salt

then filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings in the federal action
pending a ruling by the Commission.

Counsel for Hatch agreed to

the stay until the Commission had ruled on American Salt's Petition.
Hatch and American Salt filed numerous legal memoranda
with the Commission.
Commission.

On July 2, 1985 a hearing was held before the

On September 12, 1985, the Commission issued its

Report and Order dismissing American Salt's Petition.

(R. 0343;

Addendum, Exhibit A ) .
The Commission held that:
(4) The salt tariff on file with the
Commission is fair and reasonable, and Hatch is
legally required to collect the charges for
transportation services as provided in said
tariff.
(5) Any oral or written agreements to
charge a rate higher or lower than the
published rate, even assuming that such was
agreed to by Hatch and American Salt, is void
and unenforceable.
* * *

(7) American Salt is required under the
laws of the State of Utah to pay [Hatch] the
tariff rate for the transportation services
performed and other charges as set forth in the
tariff . . . .
(R. 0347; Addendum, Exhibit A, p. 5).
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III.

LEGAL ISSUE PRESENTED BY AMERICAN SALT'S APPEAL.
The only issue presented by American Salt's appeal is

whether Hatch can collect the tariff rate for transportation
services rendered for American Salt, in accordance with the tariff
filed with and approved by the Commission, notwithstanding an oral
or written agreement for a rate lower than the tariff rate.
This Court should affirm the Commission's Report and Order
because the applicable Utah statutes, Utah case law, and all other
case authority, both state and federal, clearly establish the legal
right of a regulated carrier to collect the tariff rate
irrespective of agreements for a lower rate.

There is no law to

the contrary.

IV.

UTAH STATUTE, APPLICABLE CASE LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY AS
ANNOUNCED BY THE UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION REQUIRE A
COMMON CARRIER TO CHARGE AND COLLECT THE APPLICABLE TARIFF
RATE.
A.

Utah Statute and Case Authority Prohibit Hatch From
Charging or Collecting Compensation Different From the
Tariff Rate.
As stated above, the Commission determined the reason-

ableness of the tariff and its applicability to the transportation
of salt by Hatch for American Salt.

(R. 0347; Addendum, Exhibit A,

p. 5 ) . The Commission also determined that there was no genuine
issue as to the facts that:

(1) the haul performed by tfatch for

American Salt was, in part, over a public road; (2) that American
Salt knew that the haul was partially over a public road; and
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(3) that Hatch believed the haul to be made entirely over private
roads.

(R. 0345; Addendum, Exhibit A, p 3.)
Utah statute provides:
No common carrier shall charge, demand,
collect or receive a greater or less or different
compensation for the transportation of persons or
property, or for any service in connection
therewith, than the rates, fares and charges
applicable to such transportation as specified in
its schedules filed and in effect at the time;
nor shall any such carrier refund or remit, in
any manner or by any device, any portion of the
rates, fares or charges so specified, except upon
order of the commission as hereinafter provided,
or extend to any person any privilege or facility
in the transportation of passengers or property
except such as are regularly and uniformly
extended to all persons.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-6(2) (1953) (emphasis added).
The Utah statute prohibits a common carrier from charging
a rate other than the current rate in effect under its published
tariff schedule.

Hatch is under a statutory obligation to charge

American Salt the tariff rate for the salt hauled.
In the case of Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Sterling H.
Nelson & Sons, Inc., 552 P.2d 649 (Utah 1976), this court held that
a carrier can collect the tariff rate irrespective of a lower
quoted rate.

In this case the shipper had requested a rate

quotation from the railroad.

The rate quoted by the railroad, and

used by the shipper in a bid to a third party was lower than the
correct tariff rate. After the transportation services were
performed, the railroad sued for the tariff rate. This court
granted the railroad's claim, and held that the shipper was not
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entitled to maintain a counterclaim that the railroad's negligence
in quoting a lower rate had caused the shipper damage.
B.

American Salt's Argument That the General Tariff Is
"Discriminatory" Is Without Merit.
American Salt argues that the application of the general

salt tariff is discriminatory because at certain times in the past
a special lower tariff rate involving hauls for Morton Salt had
been approved by the Commission.
In accordance with tariff Utah statute, "No common carrier
shall charge, demand, collect or receive a greater or less or
different compensation . . . than the rates . . . specified in its
schedules filed and in effect at the time; . . . "

Utah Code Ann.

§ 54-3-6(2)(1953) .
Discrimination in tariff rates can only occur where one
shipper is charged the tariff rate and another shipper is charged
something other than the applicable tariff rate.

There can be no

discrimination where the applicable tariff rate is charged.
By statute, the Commission is authorized to make certain
changes, modifications or exceptions to the general rate
structure.

Utah Code Annotated § 54-3-7 provides that no charge

can be made greater or less than the rates on file with the
Commission, "provided, that the Commission may, by rule or order,
establish such exceptions from the operation of this prohibition as
it may consider just and reasonable as to any public utility."
Special rates which the Commission approves from time to time are
temporary in nature and apply only to particular hauls.
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They do

not replace or supersede the general tariff.

The special rates for

Morton Salt had been approved by the Commission and was the tariff
applicable to those particular hauls.
The applicable rate as determined by the Commission was
the general salt tariff rate.

(R. 0345; Addendum, Exhibit A,

p. 3). There was no lower special tariff rate for this haul
approved by and filed with the Commission.

(R. 0346; Addendum,

Exhibit A, p. 4). In this regard, the Commission, in denying
American Salt's Application for Rehearing, stated:

"The tariff

rates must be charged and collected unless prior specific
authorization from this Commission is obtained."

(R. 0414;

Addendum, Exhibit B, p. 2).
The Commission, in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, has determined (1) that Hatch had a salt tariff on file that
had been properly submitted to and approved by the Commission and
which had been found to be just and reasonable; (2) that pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated § 54-3-6(2)(1953), no common carrier shall
charge, demand, collect or receive compensation different than that
specified in the tariffs filed with the Commission and in effect at
the time the transportation services are rendered, (3) that under
the law, American Salt is charged with a knowledge that any haul
over the Utah public highways is subject to the laws of the State
of Utah and therefore subject to the applicable tariff provisions
on file with and approved by the Commission, and (4) that American
Salt is required, under the laws of the State of Utah, to pay the
tariff rate for the transportation services performed and other
-7-

charges as set forth in the tariff.

(R. 0346, 0347; Addendum,

Exhibit A, pp. 4-5).
The applicable tariff rate was charged.

No other or

different tariff had been approved by the Commission.

American

Salt's argument of discriminatory rates is without any legal merit.
C.

Case Authority From Other Jurisdictions Affirms the Right
of Hatch to Collect the Applicable Tariff Rate.
The case law interpreting similar state and federal

statutes is uniform in upholding Hatch's right to collect the
applicable tariff rate.
(i)

Case Authority Interpreting Other State Statutes.

The courts have expressly recognized that tariffs are not
a contract between the carrier and the shipper, but, in fact, carry
the force of law.

In Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v.

Bouziden, 307 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1962), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated:

"A tariff, so long as it

remains in effect, binds both carriers and shippers with the force
of law."

_Id. at 234 (footnote omitted).

Similarly, in Illinois

Central Gulf Railroad Co. v. Sankey Brothers, Inc., 67 111. App. 3d
435, 384 N.E.2d 543 (1978), aff'd 78 111. 2d 56, 398 N.E.2d 3
(1979), the court stated:

"A tariff is a law, not a contract, and

has the force and effect of a statute."

Ld. at 545.

The strong public policy in favor of preventing discrimination among shippers, which has resulted in tariffs being
considered as having the legal force of a statute, has also
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resulted in the rule of law that a carrier may recover the full
tariff rate, regardless of the circumstances for any undercharge or
misquotation of rates.
Perhaps the most succinct statement of this rule is found
in Western Transportation Co. v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co.,
682 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1982) in which the court stated:

"If a

tariff is unambiguous it must be enforced according to its terms,
Id.

regardless of the equities, . . . "

at 1235.

In Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Marty,
353 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1960), the railroad brought an action for
unpaid freight charges.

The shipper counterclaimed for damages

because of the negligent misstatement of the applicable freight
rate.
The court applied a Colorado statute substantially similar
to the Utah statute:

No public utility could "charge, demand,

collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation for
any product or commodity furnished or to be furnished, . . . " than
those specified in its schedules on file and in effect at the time
the services were performed.

Id,, at 1096.

The court first noted

that in the absence of the Colorado statute, the agent's quotation
would be binding on the railroad.

The court continued:

However, the general rule which appears to be
followed uniformly without significant deviation
is that statutory policy against discriminatory
rates and rebates precludes a shipper from
asserting a claim, counterclaim or defense upon
the basis that there was negligence or mistake in
the quotation of the rates.

-9-

Id, at 1097. The court explained that the statute prohibited any
rebate regardless of the legal theory on which it was based,
whether in tort or contract.

The defendant in that case argued

that the court should not rely on federal cases in making its
determination; however, the court found these decisions to be
applicable, noting the similarities between the state and federal

The court in Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., supra,
reached the same conclusion.

The railroad brought an action to

recover shipping charges that had not been included in the original
invoice paid by the shipper.
judgment for the railroad.

The trial court granted summary

Affirming the trial court's decision,

the appellate court noted that Illinois law required carriers to
recover the full charges imposed by tariffs.

The court then noted

that, except for that statute's provision, there was a "near
vacuum" of Illinois law on the subject.

Id., at 544. The court

stated:
Although we agree that the Interstate
Commerce Act does not govern intrastate movements
of commerce, the act and the Federal interstate
cases are pertinent to an analysis of the instant
appeal. We fail to discern how the fact that
plaintiff's train did not pass over a state line
makes any difference in the outcome of this case
since the policy involved in the Interstate
Commerce Act parallels that stated in the
Illinois Public Utilities Act concerning the
mandate that carriers must collect the fulL
charges imposed by tariff so that no
discrimination or preference will occur.
49 U.S.C., §§ 1004, 1014 (1970).
Id. at 545.
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The foregoing cases are illustrative of state courts*
interpretation of statutes prohibiting common carriers from
charging or receiving rates different from those set forth in their
published tariffs. While these cases explain the general rule of
law governing these kinds of disputes, the rule has been more fully
explored in federal cases under the Interstate Commerce Act. The
Illinois Central and Denver and Rio Grande cases cited above have
noted the applicability of the federal decisions because of the
similarities between the federal and state statutes.
(ii) Case Authority Interpreting the Federal Statute.
In Walsky Construction Co. v. Sea-Land Services, Inc.,
577 P.2d 241 (Alaska 1978), the Alaska Supreme Court applied the
Interstate Commerce Act to a case where the quoted rate was
significantly lower than the published tariff rate.

The shipper

paid the original invoice in accordance with the quoted rate. The
carrier sued the shipper for the difference between the quoted rate
and the tariff rate.
The court noted that the Interstate Commerce Act forbids
an interstate carrier from charging a rate different than its
published tariff rate.

The court explained:

Uniformity in charges for transportation is the
policy of this section [of the Act]. In an
unbroken line of cases, the federal courts have
held that this policy precludes a shipper from
holding a common carrier to its word. Not by
counterclaim, setoff, or separate claim upon
theories of breach of contract, estoppel,
negligent misrepresentation, or intentional
misrepresentation may the shipper obtain a rate
lower than the published tariff. The hardship of
this rule on the unsuspecting shipper who often
has neither the time nor the expertise necessary
-11-

to determine the applicable tariff is obvious and
has been recognized. It may, in fact, be
bankrupted by relying on a false quote. However,
it is also a hardship on a shipper for its
competitor to receive a lower freight rate than
is available to the shipper. Section 6(7) of the
Interstate Commerce Act, as interpreted by the
foregoing authorities, reflects a congressional
judgment that the latter hardship outweighs the
former.
Id. at 242-43 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).

Section 6(7) of

the Interstate Commerce Act provides, like the Utah statute, that
carriers may not charge or collect compensation different from that
specified in the tariff.

The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the

trial court's summary judgment for the carrier.
Similarly, in Graves Truck Line, Inc. v. Hy Plains Dressed
Beef, Inc., 204 Kan. 275, 462 P.2d 130 (1969), the carrier brought
an action for the balance of the tariff rate.

The shipper claimed

a set-off based on the misrepresentations of the trucker.

The

court concluded that even if the carrier had been guilty of
misrepresentation, it was still entitled to recover the full
amount of the tariff rate, and the shipper was not entitled to any
set-off.

The court acknowledged that the result seemed harsh, but

stated that the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act ^as to
prevent discrimination or preference.
For other cases in which the carrier was awarded the
difference between the amount originally charged and the actual
tariff rate, see, e.g., Aero Trucking, Inc. v. Regal Tube Co., 594
F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1979) (the carrier's published tariff is the
legal rate, and the rights of the parties as defined by the tariff
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cannot be varied or enlarged by contract or tort of the carrier);
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Bouziden, supra (no
act or omission of a carrier will estop or preclude it from
enforcing payment of the tariff rate); Arkansas Oak Flooring Co. v.
Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Co., 166 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1948) cert.
denied 334 U.S. 828, 92 L.Ed. 1756, 68 S.Ct. 1338 (1948) (no legal
principle in the court's knowledge can estop a carrier from
collecting payment in accordance with the tariff; in fact, the
carrier is estopped from demanding or receiving, or the shipper
from paying, less than the full rate); and Thompson v. Richards,
158 Kan. 178, 146 P.2d 359 (1944) (neither the good faith of the
parties when the erroneous charge was made nor the giving of a
receipt marked "in full" is a defense to an action to recover the
full tariff rate).
(iii)

Breach of Contract By a Carrier Is No Defense to
the Collection of the Applicable Tariff Rate.

American Salt, although citing no legal authority, argues
that Hatch agreed to file for a lower tariff rate and that its
failure to do so was a breach of contract which now bars it from
collecting the applicable tariff rate.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.

17-18) . The contract provision on which American Salt relies is as
follows:
Carrier further agrees to obtain public
liability, property damage, and cargo insurance
with the miniumum coverage of Five Million
Dollars ($5,000,000.00). Carrier shall also
furnish and provide all licenses and permits
required by State, Federal or local authorities;
tax payments required of or on the equipment or
on the use and operations thereof, and any taxes
resulting from this Agreement or required by
-13-

Federal, state or local authorities, including
any reports connected with such taxes, licenses,
or insurance. (R. 0108) (emphasis added).
This provision obviously requires that Hatch have "the
licenses and permits" or authority to make intrastate hauls of
salt.

It has nothing to do with filing rates for the approval of

the Commission.

At the hearing before the Commission, the

Administrative Law Judge, A. Robert Thurman, advised counsel for
American Salt that the term "licenses and permits" relates to
authority to haul the commodity involved and not to rates.
(R. 0029).
There was no agreement by Hatch to file for a special
lower tariff rate; however, even assuming that there was and Hatch
breached such agreement, such breach of contract does not bar Hatch
from collecting the applicable tariff rate.
As indicated hereafter, intentional misrepresentation or
fraud is no defense to a carrier's right to collect the tariff
rate.

A fortiori, an alleged breach of contract can be no

defense.
held.

The United States Supreme Court on many occasions has so

In Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Central. Iron &

Coal Co., 265 U.S. 59, 44 S.Ct. 441, 68 L.Ed. 900 (3924), the court
stated:
The shipment being an interstate one, the
freight rate was that stated in the tariff
filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The amount of the freight charges legally
payable was determined by applying this tariff
rate to the actual weight. Thus, they were
fixed by law. No contract of the carrier could
reduce the amount legally payable, or release
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from liability a shipper who had assumed an
obligation to pay the charges. Nor could any
act or omission of the carrier (except the
running of the Statute of Limitations) estop or
preclude it from enforcing payment of the full
amount by a person liable therefor.
Id. at 902 (emphasis added).
In the case New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co.
v. York & Whitney Co., 256 U.S. 406, 65 L.Ed. 1016 (1921), the
United States Supreme Court, in enforcing a tariff rate, stated:
"The consignee could not escape the liability imposed by law
through any contract with the carrier."

I_d. at 1020.

The case of Bowser and Campbell v. Knox Glass, Inc., 390
F.2d 193 (3rd Cir. 1968), on facts similar to those in this action,
held that a breach of a contract to file for approval of an agreed
rate is no defense to the collection of the tariff rate.
stated:
It is of no legal significance that the rate
which the parties agreed upon among themselves
would probably have been approved if it had
been filed with the Commission. The forum for
dealing with the schedule of charges is the
Commission. . . .
The innocence of the shipper in
relying upon the carrier to obtain
approval of the rate they had agreed on is
equally unavailing. The rate filed is a
matter of public record of which the
shipper must take notice at his peril.
The hardship which is urged upon us is one
which has already been dealt with in cases
involving common carriers and has been
found inadequate to alter the policy
underlying the integrity of the schedule
of charges. Such instances of hardship
may not be permitted to destroy the more
far-reaching need to maintain respect for
the rates established under the
Commission's procedure and which other
-15-

The court

shippers and contract and common carriers
alike must be able to rely upon as
realistic facts rather than a screen which
conceals illegal private practices.

The applicable rule cannot be
circumvented by the reasoning, which the
district court accepted, that the failure
to file the rate agreed on with the
shipper amounted to a breach of contract
for which the damages are to be measured
at precisely the amount of the undercharges, thus eliminating the carrier's
claim. In fact, the shipper filed no
counterclaim for such damages. But
regardless of this procedural element, to
recognize a shipper's right to such
damages would be to destroy the
established principle by a change in form
of the defense. Such a defense would not
be available in an action by a common
carrier, and since we have determined that
the same principle must be maintained as
to preferential charges by a contract
carrier, it follows that the defense must
be equally unavailing in the present
action.
Id. at 196-197 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
It is clear that a breach of contract does not bar a
carrier's right to collect the applicable tariff rate. American
Salt has cited no authority to the contrary.
(iv)

Intentional Misrepresentation By a Carrier Does Not
Foreclose It From Collecting the Applicable Tariff
Rate.

American Salt argues that before Hatch agreed to transport
the salt, Hatch knew the route would be over a public road and
suggests that this knowledge made Hatch guilty of aa intentional
misrepresentation, or at least that it rebuts the finding of the
Commission that Hatch was operating under a mistake of fact that
-16-

the haul was over a private road,
59).

(Appellant's Brief, pp. 9 and

To support its argument, American Salt states that on at

least two prior occasions, Hatch had transported salt for Morton
Salt Company pursuant to a special tariff rate on file with the
Commission.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 59).

The haul for Morton Salt was from the Amax ponds to
Saltair, Utah and was over an interstate highway and therefore was
clearly a regulated haul.

(R. 0305).

An application for a special

tariff rate had been filed with and approved by the Commission.
(R. 0305).

The haul for American Salt was over a dirt road that

was not marked as a public highway and Hatch was under the mistaken
belief that the road was a private road.

(R. 0325).

Hatch only

later discovered that the route included a public road which then
required it, pursuant to Utah statute, to charge the applicable
tariff rate.

(R. 0328) .

The claim that Hatch may have intentionally misled
American Salt is without any factual support.

However, even if the

assertion of American Salt that Hatch knew beforehand that a public
road was involved is true, this does not foreclose Hatch from
collecting the applicable tariff rate.
In F. Burkhart Manufacturing Co. v. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry.
Co., 149 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1945), the court stated:
This case is ruled by the opinion of this
Court in Central Warehouse Co. v. Chicago, R.I.
& P.R. Co., 8 Cir., 20 F.2d 828, which requires
the affirmance of the judgment unless, as the
appellant contends, the cases are
distinguishable because of the fact that the
undercharges in the Central Warehouse case
resulted from a mistake of the carrier, while
-17-

in the instant case the undercharges were the
result of a deliberate intent on the part of
the appellee's agents to violate the law. But
in the Central Warehouse case this Court said
(page 829 of 20 F.2d):
Congress, in order to eliminate
every form of discrimination, has provided
that there shall be permitted neither
an intentional nor an unintentional
deviation from the predetermined schedule
of rates. . . .
In that case it was, apparently, contended
that if the failure to collect the tariff rate
was due to a mistake on the part of the
carrier, one in the situation of the appellant
could not be compelled to pay, nor could the
carrier be compelled to collect from it, the
unpaid freight charges. This Court made it
clear that the question whether the deviation
from the tariff rates was intentional or not
was of no legal importance in such an action as
this.
Id. at 910 (emphasis added).
The Burkhart case was followed in a per curiam decision in
the case of Consolidated Freightways Corporation v. Terry Tuck,
Inc., 612 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1980), which affirmed a summary
judgment in favor of the carrier:
Consolidated Freightways sued Terry Tuck for
an amount still owing under the applicable ICCapproved tariff. Terry Tuck counterclaimed
for fraud, alleging that the carrier knowingly
misquoted the shipping rates. The district
court granted Consolidated*s summary judgment
motion for the amount still due, and it
dismissed the counterclaim pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6),, The facts are
admittedly indistinguishable from those
occurring in Aero Trucking, Inc. v. Regal Tube
Co., 594 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1979); Pettibone v.
Richardson, 126 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1942), and
F. Burkhart Mfg. Co. v. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry.
Co., 149 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1945). We agree
with the Seventh and Eighth Circuits that no
claim for relief can be predicated on a
-18-

carrier's alleged fraudulent misquotation of
tariffs. Accordingly, the district court's
judgment and order are AFFIRMED,
Id. at 466.

In Aero Trucking, Inc. v. Regal Tube Co., supra, the

Court stated:
Regal initially attempts to distinguish
this case from the undercharge cases by
asserting that the undercharge cases dealt with
transportation charges while the instant case
deals with 'an unnecessary additional charge
that could and would have been avoided in
connection with these shipments but for
appellees1 fraud in the inducement.1 We find
the alleged factual difference clearly
insufficient. . . .
* * *

The type of discrimination alleged by
Regal in this case is always present in
underquotation situations. If a shipper has
knowledge that the actual tariff is greater
than the one quoted by the carrier it may well
decide to alter its business operations in
order to compensate for the higher rate. See,
e.g., Pettibone v. Richardson, 126 F.2d 969
(7th Cir. 1942). Regal argues, however, that
it reasonably relied on Aero's fraudulent
understatement of the detention charges. The
short answer to this contention is, as it is in
all undercharge cases, that the applicable
tariffs are by law incorporated into the
contract between shipper and carrier. Since
the shipper is presumed to have knowledge of
the applicable tariff rates, Regal cannot rely
on Aero's statement that no detention charges
would be assessed. As stated by the Supreme
Court:
The legal rights of shipper as
against carrier in respect to a rate are
measured by the published tariff. Unless
and until suspended or set aside, this
rate is made, for all purposes, the legal
rate, as between carrier and shipper. The
rights as defined by the tariff cannot be
varied or enlarged by either contract or
tort of the carrier.
-19-

Id, at 622-23 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
The foregoing authority is uniform,

American Salt has

quoted no contrary authority because there is none.

Intentional

misrepresentation or fraud does not bar a carrier from collecting
the applicable tariff rate.
These cases, and others like them, make it clear that
Hatch must charge American Salt the applicable tariff rate for the
services Hatch rendered.

American Salt knew the haul was over a

public road; Hatch did not.

Hatch made a good faith error.

Under

these circumstances, Hatch must charge and collect the tariff rate.
D.

Public Policy As Announced By the Utah Public Service
Commission Requires a Common Carrier to Charge and
Collect the Applicable Tariff Rate.
The Utah statute and the case law cited above are

expressive of the public policy that regulated carriers are not
free to charge any rate that they desire, but can only charge and
collect those rates which have been specifically approved by the
appropriate regulatory agency.

The Commission, in its order

denying American Salt's Application for Rehearing, announced that
it adheres to this policy, even in the face of the "equitable
arguments" of American Salt.
The Commission stated:
Notwithstanding our sympathy for
Complainant's predicament, we are constrained
by the force of case law relevant to the issues
here to sustain our earlier order; nothing
offered in the Application for Rehearing
suggests that the case law has changed. The
tariff rates must be charged and collected
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unless prior specific authorization from this
Commission is obtained. In the event that it
is demonstrated that a carrier is intentionally
misleading shippers to his pecuniary advantage,
the Commission could and certainly would
reconsider the fitness of such a carrier to
hold an operating authority; however, that does
not change the policy and requirement of law
concerning tariffs and Complainant cannot be
helped.
(R. 0414) (Addendum, Exhibit B, p. 2) (emphasis added).
The Commission has announced a policy that it will enforce
the applicable tariff rates that it has approved.

The Commission

suggests that this public policy would be enforced, even where a
carrier has intentionally misled a shipper.

In such a case, the

tariff would be enforced; but the Commission, pursuant to its
regulatory authority, could reconsider the fitness of the carrier
to hold operating authority.
The Commission's enforcement of its approved tariffs
gives order and consistency to the regulatory process, even though
in a certain specific factual situation it may work a hardship
upon a particular shipper.

All of American Salt's "equitable

arguments"1 as set forth in its Brief were made to the Commission,
which considered them and rejected them in favor of a public policy
enforcing the applicable tariff.

!

Hatch submits that American Salt's "equitable arguments"
are not particularly persuasive because, as the Commission found,
pursuant to the admission of counsel at the hearing, American Salt
knew that the haul was to be over a public road. (R. 0028; 0345;
Addendum, Exhibit B, p. 3).
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This Court should not and cannot order the Commission to
change its policy and adopt some flexible policy of tariff
enforcement.

It would be inappropriate for this Court to

substitute its judgment for that of the Commission.

The review and

approval of tariff rates are specifically the prerogative of the
Commission.

This Court should not order the Commission to consider

or to enforce agreements contrary to tariff rates where a common
carrier has entered into such an agreement based upon a mistake of
fact.
This Court stated in the case of Lewis v. Wycoff Co., 18
Utah 2d 255, 420 P.2d 264 (1966), that due to the responsibility
imposed upon the Commission and its presumed knowledge and
expertise, its findings and orders are endowed with a presumption
of validity and correctness.

The Court specifically stated:

M

It

is not our prerogative to pass upon the wisdom of the Commission's
decision."

Ld. at 266.

In PBI Freight Service v. Public Service Commission of
Utah, 598 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1979), the Court stated:
The Public Service Commission is charged
with the duty of seeing that the public
receives the most efficient and economical
service possible. This requires consideration
of all aspects of public interest, . . .
Considerations of policy are primarily the
responsibility of the Commission. It is well
settled that this Court cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the Commission. . . .
Id. at 1354 (emphasis added).
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In Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public
Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983), this Court stated:
When the decision being reviewed
represents the agency's weighing of competing
values to select a particular goal, its
interpretation of a special law, or its
application of its findings of fact to a
finding or conclusion on the 'ultimate facts'
in the case, judicial review necessarily
involves an independent judgment of the
reasonableness of the agency decision. In
these circumstances, reasonableness is measured
against a specific standard: 'The
reasonableness of the Commission's order must
be determined in light of the statutory setting
in which it operates.' Milne Truck Lines, Inc.
v. Public Service Commission, 13 Utah 2d 72,
75, 368 P.2d 590, 592 (1962). Thus,
reasonableness must be determined with
reference to the specific terms of the
underlying legislation, interpreted in light
of its evident purpose as revealed in the
legislative history and in light of the public
policy sought to be served.
* * *

There is an obvious difference between a
reviewing court's substitution of its own
preferences for the policy judgments of a
commission, which is forbidden, and a court's
reviewing commission decisions to assure that
they fall within the outer limits of
reasonableness as measured by the statutory
language, purpose, and policy, which is its
proper function.
* * *

Considerations of policy being primarily the
responsibility of the Commission, PBI Freight
Service v. Public Service Commission, supra, we
give great weight to its conclusions on matters
of this nature, and set its decision aside only
if it is outside 'the tolerable limits of
reason,' Silver Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public
Service Commission, supra, or 'so unreasonable
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that it must be deemed capricious and
arbitrary.' Williams v. Public Service
Commission, supra.
Id. at 611 and 612 (emphasis added).
The policy decision of the Commission to enforce approved
tariffs is certainly not outside the "tolerable limits of reason."
Accordingly, this Court cannot substitute its own poLicy
preferences for the policy pronouncements of the Commission that
tariff rates it has approved are to be enforced irrespective of
other competing values.
This case is simply a situation where a common carrier
(Hatch) agreed to a rate lower than the applicable tariff rate
based upon a mistake of fact that the haul was not over a public
road.

The shipper (American Salt) knew that the haul was over a

public road.

When Hatch discovered that the haul was over a public

road, it charged American Salt the applicable tariff rate.

The

Commission, under these circumstances, has determined that the
tariff rate must be enforced.

There is no legal authority for this

Court to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the Public
Service Commission.
V.

CONCLUSION
The legal issue presented by American Salt Company's

appeal is whether W.S. Hatch Co. can collect the tariff rate for
transportation services rendered for American Salt in accordance
with a tariff filed with and approved by the Utah Public Service
Commission, notwithstanding an oral or written agreement of a lower
rate based on a mistake of fact.

The Utah statute requires a
-24-

regulated carrier to charge and collect the tariff rate.

The Utah,

federal and state case authority and the announced public policy of
the Commission affirms this legal principle.

American Salt's

contention to the contrary is without any legal support or merit.
WHEREFORE, the respondent, W.S. Hatch Co., respectfully
requests that this Court affirm the Report and Order of the Utah
Public Service Commission dismissing the Petition of American Salt
Company.
Dated this

//

day of June, 1986.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Merlin 0. Baker
Enid Greene
Attorneys for Respondent,
W.S. Hatch Company
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
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Exhibit A

- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

AMERICAN SALT COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation,
Complainant,

CASE NO. 85-192-01

vs.

REPORT AND ORDER

W. S. HATCH COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,
Respondent.

ISSUED;

September 12, 1935

Appearances:
Merlin 0. 3aker
Enid Greene

For

Charles M. Bennett
John L. Fellows

W. S. Hatch Company

"

American Salt Company

By the Commission:
The hearing on W. S. Hatch Company's ("Hatch") Motion
to Dismiss

the

Complaint

filed

against

it by American

Salt

Company '"American Salt") was heard on July 2, 1985 at 10:00 a.m.
before Administrative Law Judge A. Robert Thurman, at the Cornmiscion Offices, 4th Floor, Heber M. Wells State Office Building,
160 East: 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Having been fully

advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge enters the
following

Report

containing

proposed

Findings

of

Fact, Con-

clusions of Law, and the Order based thereon.
INTRODUCTION
From April 16, 1984 to l\ay 3, 1934, W. S. Har.ch Company
(hereafter "Hatch") hauled 406 truck loads of salt, totalling

CASE NO, 85-192-01
- 2 approximately
Magnesium

17,702

Company

Grantsville, Utah.

tons,
ponds

for
to

American
the

Salt

American

from
Salt

the Ama:>:
plant

at

Part of the haul was over a public highway of

the state of Utah, a fact known by American Salt at the time the
haul took place., but which Hatch did not know, mistakenly believing the entire haul to be over private roads and thus not subject
to regulation by this Commission.

Hatch charged less than its

tariff rate for the haul because of the mistake.
After the haul ended, Hatch d«iscoveied the mistake-and
billed American Salt for Hatch's services according to the tariff
rate then on file with and 'approved by this Commission.

American

S-~.lt refused to pay the amount billed, basing its refusal on an
alleged oral agreement of a rate lover than the published tariff
rate.
Hatch filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Utah seeking payment for its transportation
services according to the tariff rate.

.American Salt immediately

thereafter filed a Verified Complaint and Application for Relief
from

Excessive

Charges

with

this

Commission,

claiming

that

r-itVs tariff rate was unreasonable and unjust under the circumstances.
The petitioner, American Salt, filed a verified petition setting forth certain facts en which it based its alleg" lions that the published tariff rate v-as unjust and unreasonable under the circumstances.

Hatch, in support of its Motion to

Dismiss, filed supporting affidavit?.
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- 3 In view of the verified complaint and affidavits filed
herein,

and

the

factual

admissions

of

the

parties,

the

Commission, in accordance with Rule 12 fb) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, will consider Hatch's Motion to Dismiss as a
Motion for Summary Judgment.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission finds that there is no genuine issue as
to the following material facts:
1.

The haul performed by Hatch for American Salt was

made, in part, over a. public road of the state of Utah.
2.

American Salt knew that part of the haul was over a

public road at the time the haul took place.

Hatch believed

the haul to be made entirely over private roads.
3.
Magnesium

Hatch

hauled

Company

Grantsville,

406

Ponds

Utah,

loads of

to

salt

the American

averaging

43.6

tons

from the Arnax
Salt
each,

plant

at

totalling

approximately 17,701.60 tons.
4.

At the time of the haul, Hatch had a salt tariff on

file that had been properly submitted to and approved by
this Commission.

The Public Service Commission has examined

and approved Hatch's salt tariff on numerous occasions.

The

Commission has found tne salt tariff to be just and reasonable .
5.

Patch's tariff rate for salt was $.35 per hundred

weight at the time of the haul.
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- 4 6.

The

cost

for the

services

Hatch

performed

for

American Salt, calculated according to the tariff rate, was
$123,911.20, plus applicable dead-heading charges.
7.

No

application was made

to this Commission

to

change the. tariff rate applicable to this haul.
8.
amount

American Salt made payments to Hatch in the total
of

$33,667.40,

leaving

an

unpaid

balance

of

$90,243.80 plus dead-heading charges.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Code Annotated § 54-5-3

(1953) specifically

r:^~vi~£s that a cordon motor carrier operating any motor vehicle
within the state of Utah may not transport either persons or
property

for compensation over the public highways except in

accordance with the provisions of the Utah Motor Carrier Act.
2.

Utah Code Annotated § 54-3-6

(2) (1953) further

provides that no common carrier shall charge, demand, collect, or
receive compensation different from that specified in the tariffs
filed with the Commission and in effect at the time transportation services are rendered.
3.

Under the law, American Salt is charged with the

kriC-v'ledqe rhat any haul over the Utah public highways is subject
to trie laws of nhe state of Utah and, therefore, to the applica*0^

tariff

provisions

on

file

with

and

approved

by

this

CASE NO. 85-192-01
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The salt tariff on file with the Commission is fair

and reasonable, and Hatch is legally required to collect the
charges for transportation services as provided in said tariff.
5.

Any oral or written agreements to charge a rate

higher or lower than the published tariff rate, even assuming
that such was agreed to by Hatch and American Salt, is void and
unenforceable.
6.

Any agreement or representation by Hatch that it

would accept less than the applicable tariff rate in payment for
its services, assuming such agreement or representation was made,
is also void and unenforceable.
7.

American Salt is required under the laws of the

State of Utah to pay the tariff rate for the transportation
services performed and other charges as set forth in said tariff.
Hatch is entitled to compensation for its services in the amount
of $123,911.20 for the salt hauled, together with all other costs
as provided by its applicable tariff, less the payments previously made by American Salt.
ORDER
NOT", THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That Respondent
W. s. Hatch Company's Motion to Dismiss the Verified Complaint
filed against it by American Salt Company is granted and said
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED

at

Salt

Lake

City,

Utah, this

12th

September, 1935.
/s/ A. Robert Thurman
Administrative Law Judge

day

of
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- 6 Approved

and confirmed

this

12 th day of September,

1985, as the Report and Order of the Commission.

/s/ Brent K. Cameron, Chairman
(SEAL)

Is!

James K. Byrne, Commissioner

I si Brian T. Stewart, Commissioner
Attest:
I si Georgia 3. Peterson, Secretary

Exhibit B

DEC 2 7 1985
& hfcucKER

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH AMERICAN SALT COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation.
CASE NO. 85-192-01
Complainant.
vs.

ORDER DENYING REHEARING

W.S. HATCH COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,
Respondent,

ISSUED:

December 24. 1985

BY THE COMMISSION:
On September 12. 1985 the Commission issued its
Report

and

Order

in

this

matter

dismissing

the

Complainant's Complaint on the basis that the Respondent
carrier. W.S, Hatch Company ("Hatch"), is required by law
to charge and collect for its transportation services in
accord with its tariff

on file with the Commission. On

October 2. 1985 Complainant filed with the Commission an
Application

for

Rehearing

setting

forth

a

number

of

alleged errors in the Commission's Order.
We

do

not

disagree

with

Complainant's

characterization of the result in this case as being harsh
and, at least from its perspective, unfair. Complainant
contracted

to

pay—and

doubtless

budgeted

accordingly—

one amount only to find that when time came for payment.

CASE NO. 85-192-01
-2it owed three or four times what it had anticipated. The
only basis for the increase in charges is the fact that
the service was performed over a public and not a private
roadway; the increase was not based upon increased costs
to Respondent.
Notwithstanding, our

sympathy

for

Complainantfs

predicament, we are constrained by the force of case law
relevant to the issues here to sustain our earlier order;
nothing offered in the Application for Rehearing suggests
that the case law has changed. The tariff rates must be
charged and collected unless prior specific authorization
from this Commission is obtained. In the event that it is
demonstrated

that

a carrier

is intentionally

misleading

shippers to his pecuniary advantage, the Commission could
and

certainly

would

reconsider

the

fitness

of

such a

carrier to hold an operating authority; however, that does
not change the policy and requirement of law concerning
tariffs and Complainant cannot be helped.
It

may

be

cognizable

by

the

state

we

would

and

that

general

Complainant

has

jurisdiction

courts

encourage

Complainant

whether they may have redress in that forum.

an

to

action
of

this

analyze

CASE NO. 85-192-01
-3DATED at Salt Lake City. Utah, this 24th day of
December. 1985.

/s/ Brent H. Cameron. Chairman
(SEAL)

/s/ James M. Byrne. Commissioner
/s/ Brian T. Stewart. Commissioner

Attest:
/s/ Georgia B. Peterson
Executive Secretary

